In this work, we aim to design a stealthy secret key generation (SSKG) scheme for a completely concealed communication system. More specifically, the data transmission is accomplished by covert communications, which requires additional keys to guarantee the covertness when Bob's channel quality is worse than a warden Willie's in a special definition. However, normal SKG schemes may raise Willie's attention and violate the design goal. Therefore, we resort to the SSKG. The derived results show that the SK capacity lower and upper bounds of the source-model SKG are not affected by the additional stealth constraint. This result implies that we can attain the stealthy SKG capacity for free when the common randomness observed at each node forms a Markov chain. We then prove that the sufficient condition to attain the SK capacity can be relaxed from physical to stochastic degradedness. In order to underline the practical relevance, we also derive a sufficient condition to attain the degradedness by the usual stochastic order for the fast fading Gaussian Maurer's (satellite) model for the source of common randomness.
I. INTRODUCTION
To realize a secure physical layer, we may consider the following two sequential layers to protect the information. The first layer is to conceal the action of transmitting signals from a warden Willie. If the action of the transmission is successfully detected by Willie, the wiretap coding [1] can provide the second layer of secrecy/confidentiality (or the hidability [2] ) for a further protection. There are two main notions to conceal the transmission of signals (or to attain the deniability [2] ): 1) stealthy communications [3] , [2] , and 2) covert communications/low probability of detection [4] , [2] , [5] , [6] . Roughly speaking, both notions conceal the desired signal in an ambient signal, such that Willie is not able to distinguish from the distributions of his observations whether a meaningful transmission is ongoing or not. In particular, in the first notion, the meaningful and meaningless signals are transmitted separately in time. Because these two signals have close distributions at Willie, he cannot distinguish them. A positive capacity can be achieved by stealth communications. In contrast, in the second notion the transmitter is either ON or OFF and then the meaningful signal is superimposed on the meaningless one, e.g., the noise at Willie. The number of message bits which can be covertly transmitted follows the square root law [2] , [4] - [6] of the block length, i.e., the corresponding Shannon rate is zero. Note that for both notions, if the main (Bob's) channel has no advantage over Willie's channel, additional keys are necessary to conceal the signals, e.g., [5] , [6] . For a more detailed comparison please refer to [7] .
In this paper, we aim to design a completely concealed communication system, where the data transmission is implemented by the covert communication scheme [6] . However, when Bob's channel quality is worse than Willie's (which will be defined rigorously in the next section,) additional secret keys shared between Alice and Bob are necessary [6, Theorem 2] to maintain the covertness. More specifically, these keys are used to switch between different codebooks to fool Willie.
Based on this fact, our motivation of this work is to design an SKG scheme which can avoid arising Willie's awareness, such that the completely concealed communications can be guaranteed. On the contrary, directly applying normal SKG schemes [8] may violate our design goal. It is because normal SKG schemes utilize public communications for advantage distillation, information reconciliation, and privacy amplification, etc. [8] . Without smartly dedicated modifications, these operations will raise Willie's attention. To achieve our goal, we resort to investigating the stealthy secret key generation (SSKG) scheme with rate-unlimited public discussions, where the idea of SSKG is from its counterpart, i.e., stealth communications [3] . Since by definition the SSKG can avoid Willie's awareness, combining it with the covert communications, we can attain the completely concealed communication.
The reason we consider the concept of stealth but not covertness for the SKG is that a rate-unlimited public discussion channel is considered in our system model. In such a channel, there is no ambient noise to hide the discussion signals. Therefore, we need to artificially generate the ambient noise, which can be achieved by the SSKG. On the contrary, if there exists a noisy public channel, covert SKG may be feasible. Especially, since the required key rate [6, Th. 2] to maintain a covert communication is zero (or more specifically, the required number of key bits is sub-linear of codeword length), the sufficiency * of using covert SKG can be an interesting future work.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We consider the stealthy source-model SKG and the effective secrecy [3] for the source-model SKG. Based on the effective secrecy constraint, we derive the capacity lower and upper bounds for SSKG, which correspond to those of SKG without the stealth constraint. It implies that the stealthy SK capacity is unchanged when the common randomness is degraded. • We then prove that the sufficient condition to attain the stealthy SK capacity can be relaxed from physical to stochastic degradedness. • We derive a sufficient condition to attain the degradedness by the usual stochastic order [10] for the fast fading Gaussian Maurer's (satellite) model [11] for the source of common randomness. * From [9] we know that if the common random source is degraded, i.e., X −Y − Z, then there exists a tradeoff between the public discussion rate R p and the maximum SK rate R k , which can be referred as:
where
. If we consider a covert public discussion, i.e., R p = 0, we will have R k = 0. But that does not mean the number of keys for each SKG is zero, which is to be investigated.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND SYSTEM MODEL
From [6, Theorem 2] we know that the following amount of secret key bits are necessary to enable covert communications:
where P 1 (Q 1 ) † and P 0 (Q 0 ) are the output distributions at Bob (Willie) when Alice is ON and OFF, respectively, ω n √ n is the number of the transmitted non-innocent symbols within the codeword length n with the constraint ω n = o(1) ∩ ω(1/ √ n) when n → ∞; ξ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, if Willie can distinguish meaningful or meaningless signals better than Bob in terms of the divergence of these two distributions, additional keys are needed to maintain the covertness. On the other way round, no key is needed. In this work, we focus on the system design when log K > 0. In this case, we propose a two-phase strategy for a completely concealed communication shown in Fig. 1 . In the first phase of the k-th round of transmission, Alice and Bob will use the SSKG to generate keys with rate R (k) SSK . In the second phase, a part of the generated keys is used for the covert communications required by (2) . Note that the remaining keys will be used for the (k + 1)-th round of SSKG due to the rate-unlimited public channel, which will be further explained later ‡ . In the following we focus on the development of the first phase, where the n-time source observations at Alice, Bob, and Willie are denoted by X n , Y n , and Z n , respectively, following the distribution P X n Y n Z n = ∏ n i=1 P XY Z with alphabets X , Y , Z, respectively. Denote the public discussion between Alice and Bob by a vector F F F ∈ X r through a noiseless channel, from which Willie can perfectly observe F F F.
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1 st phase 1 st phase 2 nd phase 2 nd phase 1 st phase Fig. 1 . The proposed 2-phase strategy for a completely concealed communication by the SSKG and covert communication when
The main step for deriving the SK capacity lower bound in this paper hinges on constructing a conceptual wiretap channel (CWTC) [12] , where we set r = n § . We construct an equivalent wiretap codebook {U n (m, w)}, where m = 1, · · · , L and w = 1, · · · , L 1 , L 2 nR and L 1 2 nR 1 are the numbers of secure and confusion messages, respectively, m and w are uniformly selected, respectively, U n (m, w) ∈ X n , ∀(m, w). In
Upper case normal/bold letters denote random variables/random vectors (or matrices), which will be defined when they are first mentioned; lower case bold letters denote vectors. And we denote the probability mass function (pmf) by P. The entropy of X is defined as H(X). The mutual information between two random variables X and Y is denoted by I(X;Y ). The divergence between distributions P X and P Y is denoted by D(P X ||P Y ). X ∼ F denotes that the random variable X follows the distribution F, whileF 1−F. The subscript i in X i denotes the i-th symbol and X i [X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X i ]. X −Y − Z denotes the Markov chain. o(·) and ω(·) are the little-o and littleomega notation for, e.g., computational complexity. · denotes the ceiling operator. The covariance between X and Y is denoted by Σ XY , while Σ X denotes the variance of X. All logarithms are in base 2. (a) + max(a, 0). ‡ A one-time initial key with rate R
SSK should be shared between Alice and Bob before the whole operation, which is out of the scope of this work. § Note that the selection of r = n is due to the construction of the CWTC. In [13, Sec. III], the authors proposed a different scheme, i.e,. one way with r = 1 to achieve the same SK capacity lower bound.
where we consider the equivalent channel from Alice to Willie:
i.e., the equivalent channel output at Willie is (Z n , F F F). Similarly, the equivalent channel output at Bob is (Y n , F F F), while U n is chosen to be independent to {X n , Y n , Z n }. The distributions of the meaningful and meaningless signals at the equivalent channel output at Willie are respectively expressed as:
In this work, we consider the following constraints:
where (6) is the average probability of error constraint at Bob; (7) is the uniformity constraint of the keys; (8) is the effective secrecy constraint, where the first term denotes the non-confusion [3] in a strong secrecy manner and the second term denotes the non-stealth. We can further rearrange (8) by simple manipulations as:
Borrowing the terminology from [3] , we coin (9) as the effective secrecy for SKG. The main difference of this work to [3] will be discussed later.
III. RESULTS AND PROOFS In the following, we show our main result. Note that we do not directly apply the effective secrecy [3] which includes both secrecy and stealth constraints, to the public channel. In contrast, we impose the stealth constraint to Willie's observations and the secrecy constraint is still applied to the source-model SKG.
Unlike the wiretap channel with the stealth constraint whose secrecy capacity is known [3] , Theorem 1 only provides the lower and upper bounds. These bounds coincide those of the secret key capacity without the stealth constraint, respectively. However, it does not guarantee that the secret key capacity is unchanged when we impose the additional stealth constraint. Therefore, we consider the case in which the two bounds match. This case leads to the fact that we can get the SSKG for free even considering the additional stealth constraint. 
Based on the CWTC, we then apply the channel resolvability analysis [17] to find the rate constraint on R 1 , i.e., the rate of confusion messages for the codebook generation, which guarantees that the effective secrecy constraint (8) is fulfilled.
From the random coding analysis derived in [18] , we have:
where (a) is by the fact that Z n and F F F are independent when the discussion F F F is meaningless, whose pmf is denoted by Q F F F and also due to the fact that U n is selected to be independent to Z n . Recall that L 1 = 2 nR 1 is the number of confusion message per bin, which is to be designed to guarantee that (12) is asymptotically zero. The main difference of this proof to that in [3] is that, by constructing a CWTC for the considered SKG model, we have an additional channel output at both Bob and Willie. This makes the considered conceptual channel distinct from that in [3] , and those results cannot be directly applied.
Similar to [3] , the RHS of (12) can be divided into two cases by whether (z n , f f f , u n ) are jointly typical or not:
where T n δ follows the δ-robust typicality [19] definition. Next, we derive the constraint ¶ on R 1 as follows:
where (a) is by [19, Lemma 18, Lemma 20] for the typicality and conditional typicality bounds; (b) is by the fact that the sum probability of jointly typical set is less than 1; (c) is by the definition of L 1 and ε ε(1 + H(U)). Then we know that
where (a) is by the specific use of the public discussion according to [12, Theorem 3] , ⊕ is the modulo addition in X ;
(b) is due to the fact that U is uniformly distributed followed by the crypto lemma [20, Lemma 2] . Following similar steps as in [17] , we can derive that d 2 → 0 as n → ∞. ¶ Note that the total rate constraint in the CWTC, i.e., Bob should be able to decode both the secret and confusion messages successfully, which is a point to point transmission problem without secrecy, can be seen from [19] . Therefore, we neglect the proof.
From the CWTC construction we know that the following rate between Alice and Bob is achievable: (15) where (a) is due to the crypto lemma and the selection of U n is independent to Y n . Then from (14) and (15), we can derive the achievable SSK rate as follows:
where (a) is by substituting (14) in addition to the assumption of memoryless and independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) common randomness. Due to the symmetry between Alice and Bob, their role can be exchanged and the other lower bound derived. This completes the proof.
Remark 3. From the chain rule of the divergence we know that
Since the left hand side of (16) is constrained by (8) and the conditional divergence is nonnegative, we know that the effective secrecy of the SSKG implies D(P F F F ||Q F F F ) ≤ ε.
Remark 4. When applying the crypto lemma in (14) or (15) for unbounded X, e.g., Gaussian cases, we may follow the argument in [21, Appendix B].
Remark 5. From [22] we noticed that the lower bound can also be proved by Slepian-Wolf coding with a proper privacy amplification.
B. Upper Bound of C E f f SK
Here we derive the upper bound of C E f f SK as follows, which is mainly adapted from the normal steps to derive the upper bound of source-model SKG, e.g., [8, Sec. 4.2.1] , with modifications to encompass the effective secrecy constraint: nR ≤ log 2 nR (a) ≤H(K)+ε=H(K|F F F, Z n )+D(P KZ n F F F ||P K P Z n F F F )+ε (b) ≤ H(K|F F F, Z n ) + D(P KZ n F F F ||P K P Z n F F F ) + D(P Z n F F F ||Q Z n F F F ) + ε where (a) is by (7) ; (b) is by the fact that divergence is nonnegative; (c) is from (8); (d) is by defining ε 2 2ε + ε 1 , where H(K|K, F F F, Z n ) ≤ ε 1 follows Fano's inequality; (e) is achieved by the steps in normal SKG capacity upper bound derivation.
Following the same steps, we can derive another upper bound without conditioning on Z, which completes the proof. Remark 6. The considered model is equivalent to the one in which Willie only can observe that a transmitter (Alice) is steadily broadcasting signals just like a base station, but Willie cannot distinguish whether the transmitter aims to do the key generation or not. Therefore, even Alice's transmission can be detected, the key generation operation is concealed.
C. The Sufficient Key Rate of the Considered Model
In the considered model, since all parties can access the same signal from the public channel, additional keys shared between Alice and Bob are necessary for them to distinguish the meaningful signal while Willie is kept unaware. Otherwise, from channel resolvability [23] , it is clear that Bob cannot distinguish whether the received signal is meaningful or not. In the following we derive a sufficient SK rate of the SSKG to encompass both keys required for the first phase in the next round of transmission and the covert communications (for the second phase in the current round) to achieve the design goal. Proposition 1. To achieve a completely concealed communication, the following SK rate R SSK is sufficient
√ n (bits/one round o f transmission). (17) Proof: For each n-observation of the common randomness, Alice can use one bit to indicate Bob the public discussion is meaningful or not. This bit is to be protected by a key. For each n-observation whose corresponding discussions are meaningless, Bob needs to store the observation of common randomness and also the data transmitted covertly in the second phase. Once Alice transmits the meaningful discussion, Bob can use the information in that round of public channel to extract all the previous keys to choose the corresponding codebook to decode the covert messages. In addition, the square root law of the key rate required by the covert communication [6, Theorem 2] results in the key rate upper bound o(1)/ √ n. As a result, we need 1 + o(1) √ n key bits for each round of transmission, on average.
IV. ON THE SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR DEGRADED
COMMON RANDOMNESS In the following, we prove that the sufficient condition to achieve C E f f SK = I(X;Y ) − I(X; Z), i.e., the common randomness forming a Markov chain X −Y − Z, which is physically degraded, can be relaxed to be stochastically degraded. We then show that the relaxed condition can be fulfilled in a broader sense by considering the fast fading Gaussian Maurer's (satellite) model [11] . The derived sufficient condition provides a simple way to verify the stochastic degradedness and thereby to identify the effective SK capacity easily. Proof: The proof is sketched in the following. Please refer to [18] for the detail. The main idea of the proof is to show that the stochastically degraded source (X,Ỹ ,Z) implies that the CWTC is also stochastically degraded, which then has the same C E f f SK as that of the CWTC from a physically degraded source (X,Y, Z). There are three main steps. The first step is to apply the CWTC to the source (X,Y, Z) and prove that, if X − Y − Z, then U − Y − Z , i.e., the corresponding CWTC is also a physically degraded one, where the equivalently received signals at Bob and Willie in the CWTC are Y (Y,U ⊕ X) and Z (Z,U ⊕ X), respectively. The second step is to derive an equivalent CWTC (U,Y , Z ) from U − Y − Z by the same marginal property, where Y (Ỹ ,U ⊕ X) and Z (Z,U ⊕ X) and (U,Y , Z ) is a stochastically degraded CWTC. The third step is to derive the stochastically degraded source (X,Ỹ ,Z) from X − Y − Z.
Comparing the results of the second and third steps, we find that these two stochastic degradedness expressions are identical. That means that, if (X,Ỹ ,Z) is stochastically degraded of (X,Y, Z), then (U,Y , Z ) is stochastically degraded of (U,Y , Z ), vice versa. Then by same marginal property we know that C E f f SK of the source (X,Ỹ ,Z), which can be found by the CWTC (U,Y , Z ), is the same as that of (U,Y , Z ), i.e., the C E f f SK of (X,Y, Z).
The following example shows the usage scenario. Example 1: Consider the fast fading Gaussian Maurer's (satellite) model [11] as follows: X = A X S+N X , Y = A Y S+N Y , and Z = A Z S + N Z , where N X , N Y and N Z are independent AWGN's at Alice, Bob and Willie, respectively, while all are with zero mean and unit variance; A X , A Y , and A Z ∈ R follow CDFs F X , F Y , and F Z , respectively, are the i.i.d. fast fading channel gains from the common random source S to Alice, Bob, and Willie, respectively. Note that X, Y and Z have no degradedness relation in general due to the random fading. Commonly, we only consider deterministic channel gains with the order a X ≥ a Y ≥ a Z to form the stochastic degradedness. To derive the sufficient condition to ensure that Z is a stochastically degraded version of Y and also Y is a stochastically degraded version of X, first we introduce the following definition and theorem. Let A = d A denote that A and A have the same distribution. Thus, if the random channels A X , A Y , and A Z fulfill
for all a, where the subscripts denote the squares of the channels, then from Theorem 3 we have equivalent (in the sense of having the same SSKG capacity) observations at Alice, Bob and Willie aŝ X =Â X S + N X ,Ŷ =Â Y S + N Y , andẐ =Â Z S + N Z , respectively, whereÂ 2 X ≥Â 2 Y ≥Â 2 Z almost surely. Therefore, it is clear that
(a) is a less strict sufficient condition to guarantee the stochastic degradedness among X,Y and Z.
Example 2: Continuing Example 1, assume A X , A Y and A Z are from fading channels with their magnitudes following Nakagami-m distribution with shape parameters m x , m y , and m z , and spread parameters w x , w y and w z [25] , respectively. From Theorem 2 we know that Z is a degraded version of Y and also Y is a degraded version of X, if 
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we investigate the source model stealthy secret key generation, which is used to construct a completely concealed communication system. The results show that the SK capacity lower and upper bounds of source-model are not affected by the additional stealth constraint. This implies that we can attain the stealthy SK capacity for free when the common randomness forms a Markov chain. We then prove that the sufficient condition to attain the SK capacity can be relaxed from physical to stochastic degradedness. We also derive a sufficient condition to attain the degradedness by the usual stochastic order for the fast fading Gaussian Maurer's (satellite) model for the common randomness source.
